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IN T'HE SUPREME COURT
Q~F T'HE STATE OF UTAH
LEARA ANN DEVEREAUX,
Plaintiff a.nd Appellant,
-vs.GENERAL ELECTRIC
COl\IP ANY, a corporation,
and HAROLD J. McKEEVER,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 8472

Petition for Rehearing
Come now the defendants and respondents and respectfully petition the Court for a rehearing of the above
case and of the decision made and filed December 10,
1956; and state and allege that the Court has erred in the
following particulars :
1. The majority opinion mentions and considers
only the negligent failure of plaintiff to look or if she
did look her negligent failure to see what was there to
be seen. No consideration appears to have been given
by the majority opinion to the U-turn made by plaintiff
and appellant in complete violation of Sec. 41-6-67, Utah
Code Annotated 1953.
1
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2. The majority opinion contains inconsistent legal
conclusions.
3. The majority opinion disregards a long line of
decisions by this Court and in effect reverses these decisions only by implication, thus clouding well established
precedents.

ARGUMENT

POINT1. NEGLIGENT U-TURN IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 41-6-67, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF ACCIDENT.
From the uncontroverted facts in this case as recited
by the majority opinion, plaintiff and appellant was
negligent in two respects, not just one. First, she was
negligent in not looking, or if she did look, in failing to
see what was there to be seen. This negligence was admitted by the majority opinion, but it was held that this
failure to see was not necessarily as a matter of law the
proximate cause of the accident. But what of the other
negligence of plaintiff and appellant'? What about making a U-turn 'Yithin 500 feet of the crest of a hill "There
the turning vehicle could not be seen b3~ a car approaching from the same direction until such car had topped the
crest f This is an independent act of negligence "~hich is
not related to plaintiff's failure to see. To illustrate the
point let us take an example. .L.\_ssume '' . A.'~ makes a
U -turn on a straight and level high"~ay- vrhere there are
no obstructions to Yisibility. ''A~' fails to observe
on-coming traffic and is struck by ''B.'' There "~as noth2
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ing illegal or improper about the place where "A"
attempted to make the U -turn. ''A'' 's negligence was
his failure to maintain a proper lookout and his turning
when on-coming traffic created a hazard.
Now assume "A" made aU-turn within 400 feet of
the crest of a hill and from which point there was no visibility back over the crest. Assume ''A'' fails to observe
traffic before starting the U -turn. Assume "A" is struck
by a car traveling in the same direction as ''A.'' Now
"A" is clearly negligent as a matter of law in two respects: (1) Failure to maintain a lookout, and (2) making
aU-turn in a place where it is illegal to do so.
The precise and only reason that our statute forbids
a U-turn near the crest of a grade when the turnin·g
vehicle cannot be seen by an approaching car within 500
feet is to prevent an accident such as is involved in this
ease. A turn made in violation of this statute is a negligent turn as a matter· of. law. Furthermore, such an
illegal and negligent turn must have been a contributing
proximate cause of this particular accident. Whether
plaintiff sa\v or even looked for other cars is far less a
contributing factor to this accident than the choice of the
place where she did attempt her illegal and negligent
c·-tu rn. The record viewed in the most favorable light
from plaintiff-appellant's viewpoint clearly establishes
that there was no visibility from the place of impact over
the crest of the hill ( R. 37), and that the U-turn was
attempted at a point not over 400 feet from the crest
3
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(R. 60). Plaintiff-appellant attempted her U-turn in a
place which the law recognized to be dangerous and haz-

ardous and therefore absolutely prohibited. Are we now
to say that motorists may violate this absolute prohibition and then if an accident occurs demand the right to
submit their case to a

jury~

Proximate cause as well as

negligence must be found as a matter of law and not be

left to conjecture by a jury.
The majority opinion recites that "the jury could
reasonably find that she (plaintiff-appellant) used due
care in starting to make the turn as she did.'' The ma-

jority opinion also recites, "for even though she (plaintiff-appellant) had observed all of the existing conditions she was not necessarily negligent in proceeding into
the highway as she did.'' (Italics added) \\ e submit the
error of these conclusions. Under Utah Statute no I.--turn
could legally be made by anyone, including the officer, at
the particular place involved. An illegal turn is not and
ca.nnot be a turn made 'Yith ''due care,'' and ''not necessarily negligent.''
We conclude, therefore, that the majority opinion
must of necessity haYe been considering only the negligent failure of plaintiff appellant to look or if she did
look her negligent failure to see "~hat "~as there to be
seen. ..At no point does the majority opinion appear to
have considered the independent negligent action of
attempting a lT-turn at a place "~here it 'vas forbidden.
This illegal act must be held to be a contributing proximate cause of the accident "~hich resulted.
4
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POINT II. THE MAJORITY OPINION
CONTAINS INCONSISTENT LEGAL CONCLUSIONS.
The majority opinion states ''Appellant's failure to
see the stopped cars undoubtedly was negligence.'' Also,
"So she either did not look or failed to observe what
\Yas there to be seen before she entered the highway to
make the U-turn and in that respect she was negligent as
a matter of la\v.''
In spite of these two categorical conclusions by the
majority opinion that plaintiff was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law, we find two statements which are
completely inconsistent therewith. These two inconsistent
statements are: "The jury could reasonably find that she
used due care in starting to make the turn as she did,''
and ''she was not necessarily negligent in proceeding into
the highway as she did.''
Are the trial courts of Utah to be left with these
inconsistent conclusions to confuse them in trying future
automobile collision cases~ We hope not.
POINT III. THE REVERSAL, BY IMPLICATION ONLY, OF A WELL ESTABLISHED
LINE OF DECISIONS CLOUDS THE PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT.
This Court in Cederlof v. 1Vhited, 110 Utah 45, 169
Pac. 2d 777; Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. 2d
495; Cox v. Thompson, ______ Utah ______ , 254 Pac. 2d 1047, and
Benson v. D. & R. G. vV. Ry., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 Pac. 2d
790, denied recovery because the injured party was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In each of
5
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these cases the contributory negligence consistent of failure to maintain a proper lookout or of failure to see what
was there to be seen. In one of the above cases/ in addition to this failure to see what was there to be seen, the
plaintiff was also walking across a busy highway at a
place where no cross walk was· marked. While it was not
illegal for plaintiff to cross at such a point, the statute did
provide that the pedestrian was bound to yield the right
of way to a vehicle upon the road. This court held that
''If decedent had yielded the right of way to defendant's
automobile or if he had looked up the road and seen the
approaching car and paid heed to the danger which it
presented, the accident would never have happened. It is
patent that the negligence of the decedent was a substantial factor in bringing about his death."
In the case now before this court the plaintiff-appellant made an illegal and absolutely prohibited U-turn in
addition to failing to see \vhat ''as there for her to see.
If the majority opinion stands, confusion and uncertainty
will result \vi.th respect to the la\v established by the
foregoing cases.
The majority opinion cites as precedent decisions
three Utah cases, Con1bs Y. Perry, :J l;tah 2d 381, 275
Pac. 2d 680; Lo1Dder Y. Holley, 1"20 Utah 231, 283 Pac. 2d
350; Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, "281 Pac. 2d 209. In
all three of these cases the plaintiff ,,~as the favored party
with the right of \Yny. In each case plaintiff \vas legally
at the place of impact and defendant ""as clearly Yiolatiug
h<tsic statutes of our State. In all thr(~e cases this Court
1Cox v. Tho.n1·pson, supra.

6
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further found that even if plaintiff had looked and seen
'vhat was there to be seen that each of the plaintiffs could
have proceeded as they did without necessarily being
negligent because of their favored position and because of
their right to assume that the defendants would yield the
right of way. None of these same propositions apply in
favor of this plaintiff in the case now being argued. Plaintiff had no right of vvay, she was illegally turning within
the 500 foot danger area from the crest of a hill, and she
failed to maintain a proper lookout. Not one of the controlling factors are here present which prompted this
Court to permit the issue of contributory negligence to
go to the jury in the three cases cited by the majority.
We close by referring the Court to the excellent and
compelling logic of the dissenting opinion. We submit
that this opinion argues this case for us in a most logical
and convincing manner.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM,
Attorneys for RespDndents
307 Utah Oil Building,
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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